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Let (A,B)(A,B) be a bimatrix game with a unique Nash equilibrium point in the interior Σ˚\mathring\Sigma of the strategy space Σ\Sigma. Suppose this equilibrium is stable under either the best-response (BR) dynamics or the fictitious-play (FP) dynamics. Hofbauer's converse conjecture. The game (A,B)(A,B) must be a zero-sum game, meaning that it is linearly equivalent to a game (C,D)(C,D) satisfying C+D=0C+D=0. This is the converse of the convergence theorem for zero-sum games: zero-sum games have orbits converging to the set of Nash equilibria, whereas it remains open whether the stated stability and uniqueness properties force a game to be zero-sum.

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