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In metric social choice, voters rank candidates by distance in an unknown metric space, while a randomized voting rule must use only these rankings. The paper introduces random-size stable lotteries and proves that, by mixing a suitably chosen random-size stable lottery with Integrated Veto, one obtains a randomized voting rule with metric distortion at most 11641/5000=2.328211641/5000=2.3282. This improves the previous best upper bound of 2.52.5. The proof combines infinite-dimensional conic linear-programming duality, heuristic nonlinear optimization, and exact rational verification using polynomial nonnegativity in the Bernstein basis.

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