Improving Randomized Metric Distortion to 2.3282
Statement
In metric social choice, voters rank candidates by distance in an unknown metric space, while a randomized voting rule must use only these rankings. The paper introduces random-size stable lotteries and proves that, by mixing a suitably chosen random-size stable lottery with Integrated Veto, one obtains a randomized voting rule with metric distortion at most . This improves the previous best upper bound of . The proof combines infinite-dimensional conic linear-programming duality, heuristic nonlinear optimization, and exact rational verification using polynomial nonnegativity in the Bernstein basis.
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