Let f be a neutral social choice function for n voters and m alternatives, and let M_i(f) be voter i's manipulation power, the probability under the uniform random preference…
Statement
Let f be a neutral social choice function for n voters and m alternatives, and let M_i(f) be voter i's manipulation power, the probability under the uniform random preference model that voter i has a profitable manipulation. For m=3, the report proves that if f is ε-far from dictatorship then Σ_i M_i(f) ≥ Cε². The open questions are: can the corresponding lower bound on max_i M_i(f), currently Ω(1/n), be improved; can neutrality be replaced by the weaker condition that f is far from having range of size at most 2; and does an analogous theorem hold for m>3, perhaps with a bound polynomially weaker in m?
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