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Let Λ∈(0,1)\Lambda\in(0,1) be a peak. A Single-Peaked Jump Schelling Game and a Single-Peaked Swap Schelling Game are instances of the respective models, and NE⁡\operatorname{NE} denotes a Nash equilibrium. Equilibrium-existence complexity conjecture. For both the Single-Peaked Jump Schelling Game and the Single-Peaked Swap Schelling Game, it is NP-hard to decide whether a given instance admits an NE⁡\operatorname{NE}. This is a main open problem for both game variants; the paper establishes hardness for finding equilibria via improving-response dynamics and notes NP-hardness of equilibrium-existence decisions when stubborn agents are allowed, but the stated result without that assumption remains open.

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