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Statement

Consider the exact slow game NIM(n,n−1)(n,n-1) for ℓ\ell players: a position is a non-negative nn-vector, players move cyclically, and on each move a player keeps one entry unchanged and decreases each of the other n−1n-1 positive entries by 11. A position with at least two non-positive entries is terminal; the player whose turn it is loses, and the other ℓ−1\ell-1 players share the payoff C−L(P)ℓ−1\frac{C-L(P)}{\ell-1}, where L(P)L(P) is the play length and CC exceeds the length of every play from the initial position. The GM-rule specifies a strategy for each player, including the move that keeps the largest entry when no entry is a multiple of ℓ\ell. GM-rule Nash equilibrium conjecture. The set of ℓ\ell GM-strategies forms a uniform Nash equilibrium. The claim concerns the strategic behavior induced by the GM-rule in the multiplayer exact slow NIM game; the supplied text does not state whether it has been proved or disproved.

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